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"Evidence in chief" doctrine does not limit
CPLR 3111.
Although CPLR 3101(a) sets forth the general disclosure
guidelines-full disclosure of. all evidence material and necessaryCPLR 3111 states that a notice may require the production of
"books, papers and other things" and CPLR 3120 provides that
such things must be set forth with reasonable particularity. Even
though there is no express cross-reference between these sections,
one commentator has stated that "the rules which govern what
may be a proper subject for examination before trial under CPLR
3101 also determine what documents must be produced for use at
an examination under CPLR 3111." 127 Therefore, it appears that
where the material desired falls within the scope of an exclusionary
provision of CPLR 3101, the court will not allow discovery, since
3101 should control.
In Rutherford v, Albany Medical Center Hosp.,128 the court
was expressly confronted with the interplay of 3101 and 3111, and
held that 3101 was controlling. However, in reaching its decision,
the court seemed to isolate itself from prior New York rulings which
held that documents which are to be produced for discovery and
inspection must be admissible as evidence at the trial. 29 The court
stated that "the mere fact that documents may be inadmissible at
the trial as evidence in chief should not prevent their disclosure at
CPLR 3101(a):

pretrial examination."
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The reasoning of this case together with the reasoning adopted
by the court in West v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,13 ' seems to indicate
a liberalizing trend as to what material should be available on pretrial examinations. As a result, it appears that the barrier erected
by the courts under pre-CPLR cases is slowly disintegrating and
that all evidence not excluded under CPLR 3101(b)-(d) will be
available for discovery and inspection.
CPLR 3101(a): Names of wdtnesses may be obtained on disclosure.
Previously, it was believed that Rios v. Donovan'132 had held
that witnesses' names and addresses were a proper subject of in1273 WmiNsTzm,

(1965).
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uo See, e.g., People ex reL. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156
N.E. 84 (1927); Peters v. Marquez, 21 Misc. 2d 720, 196 N.Y.S.2d 840
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1959).
130 Rutherford v. Albany Medical Center Hosp., 48 Misc. 2d 1017, 1019,

266 N.Y.S.Zd 470, 473 (Sup. Ct Albany County 1965).
13149 Misc. 2d 28, 266 N.Y.S2d 600 (Sup. Ct Onondaga County 1965).
13221 App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S2d 818 (1st Dep't 1964).
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quiry in an examination 13before
trial when the witnesses were wit3
nesses to the event itself.
However, the Supreme Court, Erie County, in Majchrzak v.
3
Hagerty,1
' has stated that the Rios case did not so hold. The
court here asserted that Rios was "merely concerned with the procedure to be followed in attempting to obtain such disclosure." 135
Majchrzak involved a suit for damages sustained by plaintiff
in an automobile accident. Plaintiffs examined defendant before
trial, at which time defendant stated that he knew the names of
witnesses, but that he refused to disclose them. Plaintiffs then
sought an order directing defendant to supply this information.
The court noted that plaintiff's injuries prevented her from
obtaining the names of any witnesses to the accident. Also, an
extensive investigation by plaintiff failed to provide any information.
Therefore, the court held that where the information is necessary
to establish what occurred, and where the party seeking it was or
is unable with due 3 diligence
to obtain it, the names of witnesses
6
should be disclosed.

Thus, the court, while not accepting Rios as authority for the
position it takes, nevertheless arrives at the same conclusion.
CPLR 3101(d): Where statements are material prepared for
litigation they are not available for disclasure.
Kandel v. Tocher 37 and Finegold v. Lewzis 8 held that accident reports made by an insured to his insurance company were
material prepared for litigation and, thus, were conditionally privileged from disclosure under CPLR. 3101(d).
In Parker v. New York Tel. Co.,139 the appellate division,
third department, joined the first and second departments in stating
that where statements are material prepared for litigation, they are
not available for disclosure, unless they can no longer be duplicated
and their withholding will result in injustice and undue hardship. The
court followed Kandel despite the fact that that case involved
reports made to an insurance company, while Parker involved reports prepared for a self-insured.
1 40
Another third department case, Welch v. Globe Indem. Co.,

however, while approving of the reasoning in Kandel and Finegold,
33
'1

Votey v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 46 Misc. 2d 554, 260 N.Y.S.2d

124 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); 7B McKnrNEc's CPLR 3120, supp.
commentary 58, 59 (1965).
134 49 Misc. 2d 1027, 268 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1966).
'35 Majchrzak v. Hagerty, 49 Misc. 2d 1027, 1028, 268 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938
(Sup. Ct. Erie County 1966).
136 Id. at 1028, 268 N.Y.S2d at 939.
13722 App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1965).
138 22 App. Div. 2d 447, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't 1965).
139 24 App. Div. 2d 1067, 265 N.Y.S.2d 740 (3d Dep't 1965).
14025 App. Div. 2d 70, 267 N.Y.S.2d 48 (3d Dep't 1965).

